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THE PRESS AND GUANTANAMO BAY
MICHELLE LINDO MCCLUER & ALLEN DICKERSON*
In a widely-reported development, four journalists were expelled from the United States naval 
installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in March 2010.1  The reporters had purportedly run afoul of  
Department of  Defense (DOD) rules concerning access to the military commission being held on 
base that week.26SHFLÀFDOO\WKH\KDGSXEOLVKHGWKHQDPHRI DIRUPHU86LQWHUURJDWRUZKRDS-
peared as a defense witness for Omar Khadr, a Canadian national being tried before the commission 
for the killing of  an American soldier in Afghanistan.3  That interrogator, Joshua Claus, had already 
EHHQLGHQWLÀHGQXPHURXVWLPHVLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSUHVV41RQHWKHOHVVFHUWDLQ'2'RIÀFLDOVKDG
insisted that Mr. Claus be referred to only as “Interrogator No. 1.”
The quartet allegedly violated the “Media Policy and Ground Rules” all journalists must sign be-
fore entering Cuba.5  Three of  the journalists—The Miami Herald’s Carol Rosenberg, The Toronto 
Star’s Michelle Shephard, and Canwest’s Steven Edwards—had their bans lifted after signing letters 
* Michelle Lindo McCluer (B.A., Oklahoma, 1994; J.D., Oklahoma, 1997) served as the Executive Director of  the 
National Institute of  Military Justice from 2008 to 2011 and is an adjunct professor at American University Washington 
College of  Law.  She was an active duty United States Air Force judge advocate for over a decade.  Allen Dickerson 
(B.A., Yale, 2002; J.D., New York University, 2005) is Legal Director of  the Center for Competitive Politics. He was 
SUHYLRXVO\DOLWLJDWLRQDVVRFLDWHZLWKWKH1HZ<RUNRIÀFHRI .LUNODQG	(OOLV//3DQGKDVVHUYHGDVDSURERQR
DWWRUQH\IRUWKH1DWLRQDO,QVWLWXWHRI 0LOLWDU\-XVWLFHDQGDVDODZFOHUNZLWKWKH2IÀFHRI WKH$LU)RUFH*HQHUDO
Counsel.
1  Jeremy W. Peters, News Media Seek Loosening of  the Pentagon’s Rules at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010), http://
TXHU\Q\WLPHVFRPJVWIXOOSDJHKWPO"UHV ('')()$&$'%	VHF 	VSRQ 	SDJHZDQW
ed=2. See also Spencer Ackerman, 3HQWDJRQ%DQV)RXU-RXUQDOLVWV)URP*XDQWDQDPR%D\IRU5HSRUWLQJ,QWHUURJDWRUȨV1DPH,
WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT (May 6, 2010), http://washingtonindependent.com/84200/pentagon-bans-four-journalists-
from-guantanamo-bay-for-reporting-interrogator-1s-name.
2 See generally DEP’T OF DEF., MEDIA POLICY AND GROUND RULES FOR NAVAL STATION GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (GTMO) 
(2010) [hereinafter DOD Media Policy], available at www.defense.gov/news/d20100910groundrules.pdf  (describing what 
can be photographed, who can be sketched, and  how the media can travel to Guantanamo as of  March 10, 2010).  See 
also JTF-GTMO Media Ground Rules Guantanamo Bay NAS, Cuba as of  October 2007, http://media.miamiherald.com/
VPHGLDMWIJURXQGUXOHVVRXUFHSURGBDIÀOLDWHSGI 7KLVYHUVLRQRI WKHUXOHVLVPRUHDFFXUDWHIRURXU
purposes.  The version from September 2010 corrects some of  the issues from the March 2010 banning problem).
3  Peters, supra note 1, at 1.
4 See, e.g., Khadr Interrogator Convicted in Prisoner’s Torture Death, TORONTO STAR (March 14, 2008), http://www.thestar.
com/news/article/346304.
5  Peters, supra note 1, at 1.
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stating that they understood the reason for their expulsions.6  Paul Koring of  The Globe and Mail in 
Toronto refused to sign such a statement, but later regained access to the base for the completion of  
Khadr’s commission in Fall 2010.7
The expulsions raise important questions of  law, as the exclusion and regulation of  press cover-
DJHRI WKHFRPPLVVLRQVLOOXVWUDWHWKHFRQÁLFWRI WZRLPSRUWDQWQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV2QRQHKDQGOLHV
WKHQHHGWRVDIHJXDUGFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGSURWHFWWKHOLYHVRI $PHULFDQLQWHOOLJHQFHVRXUFHV
On the other hand, there is a need for an adequately-informed democratic debate concerning a ma-
jor issue of  American domestic and foreign policy.  Both interests are vital, and a compromise must 
be found.  Press access to the Guantanamo military commissions therefore provides a case study for 
considering the broader issue of  the First Amendment’s application to coverage of  military proceed-
LQJVZKHQWKH\FRQFHUQFODVVLÀHGRUVHQVLWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQ
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXAMPLE OF COURTS-MARTIAL
Government attempts to enjoin publication of  particular information—prior restraint—are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional.8  This presumption attaches even in cases where the government asserts 
national security concerns.9  Indeed, among the seminal cases of  First Amendment jurisprudence, 
one—New York Times Co. v. United States10³GHDOWVSHFLÀFDOO\ZLWKDQDWWHPSWE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW
WRSUHYHQWSXEOLFDWLRQRI FODVVLÀHGGRFXPHQWVGHWDLOLQJ$PHULFDQVWUDWHJ\LQWKH9LHWQDP:DU11
,QPDQ\ZD\VWKHURRWVRI )LUVW$PHQGPHQWMXULVSUXGHQFHOLHLQWKHHQGXULQJFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ
protecting the nation and maintaining a fully informed electorate.12  The challenges posed by this 
century’s military commissions are not unique.
` 11zIn the context of  civilian trials, the press may “print with impunity” whatever it observes 
at an open hearing.13  The very limited exceptions to this general rule—the press may be enjoined 
from publishing information obtained in violation of  the attorney-client privilege,14 as well as infor-
6  Id. at 2.
7  Author McCluer personally witnessed Koring at Guantanamo Bay for the completion of  the Khadr trial.
8  Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
9  See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
10  Id.
11  Id. (““Any system of  prior restraints of  expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.’”) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
12  John F. Kennedy, President of  the United States, speech at Vanderbilt University 90th Anniversary Convocation 
(May 18, 1963) available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/Remarks-in-Nashville-
at-the-90th-Anniversary-Convocation-of-Vanderbilt-University-May-18-1963.aspx (“The ignorance of  one voter in a 
democracy impairs the security of  all.”).
13  Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Ct. of  Okla. Cty., 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977).
14  See United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding temporary restraining order preventing 
CNN from publishing recordings of  telephone calls made  from prison between Noriega and his attorney); State-
Record v. State, 504 S.E.2d 592 (S.C. 1998) (upholding temporary restraining order preventing publication of  videotape 
containing privileged communication between an accused and his attorney).
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mation obtained through discovery where the publisher itself  is a party15—tend to support its valid-
ity and scope.
While the press may generally print whatever it learns at an open hearing, judges do have the 
power to legitimately close otherwise public hearings to safeguard vital public interests.  But such 
closings run counter to the press and public’s First Amendment rights of  access to criminal trials.16
There is no question that such a right exists for trials and certain other proceedings, at least in the 
federal courts.17  For novel situations, Richmond Newspapers18 establishes a two-part test to determine 
whether the media enjoys a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials.  First, under the “ex-
perience prong,” a court must determine whether such proceedings have historically been open to 
the public.19  Second, under the “logic prong,” the court must decide whether public access to the 
SURFHHGLQJVSOD\VDVLJQLÀFDQWUROHLQWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRI WKHMXGLFLDOV\VWHP20  Probable cause hear-
ings meet this test because of  their centrality to the criminal justice system; because many criminal 
cases are disposed of  at this stage, probable cause hearings often provide the only opportunity for 
public scrutiny.217KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVLGHQWLÀHGDVLPLODUSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLQVXSSUHVVLRQKHDULQJV
as they often deal with issues of  government misconduct.22
On the other hand, proceedings may be closed under the Richmond Newspapers’ experience/
logic test in certain circumstances, including those involving the protection of  national security.  
The Third Circuit has ruled that the test allows for closed deportation proceedings to vindicate 
certain national security interests.23  That case, North Jersey Media Group, is particularly relevant since 
it occurred in the context of  removal proceedings—administrative procedures conducted before 
an Article III court.24  Nonetheless, the court chose to apply the experience/logic test of  Richmond
Newspapers, despite suggestions from the government that it not do so.25
North Jersey Media Group arose out of  the many deportations that occurred following the attacks 
of  September 11, 2001, when the Department of  Justice closed the deportation proceedings of  
15  See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that a protective order prohibiting dissemination of  
information gathered through discovery did not violate petitioner’s First amendment rights). 
16  See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558–81 (1980).  While such a First Amendment right 
exists in the context of  both civilian and military courts, it is entwined with an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial.  The rights, however, are distinct.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 
601 (1982); ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997).  
17  See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I) (upholding public access to jury 
selection proceedings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (upholding public 
access to pre-trial probable cause hearings).
18  448 U.S. 555 (1980).
19  Id. at 564–69.
20  Id. at 569–573; see also El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993); Press-Enterprise II at 8; 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604–07; United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982).
21  Press-Enterprise II at 12.
22  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45–46 (1984).
23  N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002).
24  Id. at 200.
25  Id. at 207–08.
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“special interest” individuals.26  The Third Circuit found that these deportation proceedings failed 
both prongs of  the Richmond Newspapers test.  After reviewing the history of  public access to admin-
istrative procedures, the court found that such hearings lacked the unbroken history of  openness 
inherent in Article III criminal trials.27  Moreover, under the “logic” prong, the court considered 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW·VDUJXPHQWVVXSSRUWLQJWKHFORVHGKHDULQJVVSHFLÀFDOO\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHGDQJHURXV
possibility that terrorist groups could discover intelligence sourcing and methods, weaknesses in 
U.S. border protection, and information regarding the identity of  compromised terrorist cells.28  The 
government claimed that immigration judges did not have the expertise to balance these concerns 
on an individual basis, and that a blanket closing of  the relevant proceedings was, consequently, 
logical.29  The court agreed, stating that the the dangers enumerated by the government outweighed 
the advantages of  openness.30  The Third Circuit declined to apply the First Amendment to removal 
proceedings, which remained closed.  The Sixth Circuit, meanwhile, conducted similar analysis and 
ruled differently, emphasizing that “[o]pen proceedings, with a vigorous and scrutinizing press, serve 
to ensure the durability of  our democracy.”31
A. Application of  the First Amendment
Once public First Amendment rights attach to a proceeding, the test for constitutionally closing 
such a trial or hearing parallels the application of  strict scrutiny in this and other contexts.32  A judge 
PD\QRWFORVHDFULPLQDOWULDODEVHQWDFRPSHOOLQJLQWHUHVWDUWLFXODWHGRQWKHUHFRUGÀQGLQJWKDW
DOWHUQDWLYHDFWLRQVVKRUWRI FORVLQJWKHFRXUWURRPZRXOGSURYHLQVXIÀFLHQWWRSURWHFWWKDWLQWHUHVW33
The rule applies to the closure of  part or all of  a proceeding, a decision that must also be narrowly 
tailored to the affected interest. 34  For instance, the court could close only the parts of  the trial that 
DFWXDOO\GHDOZLWKWKHVHQVLWLYHRUFODVVLÀHGHYLGHQFH35
The law is similar in the context of  courts-martial under the Uniform Code of  Military Justice 
8&0-VSHFLÀFDOO\ZKHQDQLQGLYLGXDOVHHNVWRVKLHOGSDUWRI DFRXUWPDUWLDOIURPWKHSXEOLF36  In 
this area, military appellate courts have held that the First Amendment grants the public a right to 
attend and observe courts-martial, and the same principles of  compelling interest and narrowly-
26  Id. at 202–03.
27  Id. at 213.
28  Id. at 218–19.
29  Id. at 219.
30  Id. at 220.
31  Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002).
32  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to freedom of  speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 
86DSSO\LQJVWULFWVFUXWLQ\WRFDPSDLJQÀQDQFH/HPRQY.XUW]PDQ86DSSO\LQJVWULFW
scrutiny test to the Establishment Clause). 
33  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
34  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607–10 (1982).
35  See 5LFKPRQG1HZVSDSHUV86DWQ´>1@DWLRQDOVHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDERXWFRQÀGHQWLDOLW\PD\
sometimes warrant closures during sensitive portions of  trial proceedings, such as testimony about state secrets.”).
36  10 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (2010).
5NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 2, No. 1
tailored policy apply.37  Examples of  such a compelling interest naturally include the protection of  
FODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQ38ZKLFKLVWKHRQO\´FORVHDEOHµLQWHUHVWVSHFLÀFDOO\FRQWHPSODWHGE\WKH5XOHV
for Courts-Martial.39
Of  particular importance in the context of  this article, the appellate courts have recognized that 
the press itself  has standing within the court-martial system to legally enforce its First Amendment 
prerogatives.40  The simultaneous presence of  an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
further complicates the situation, providing an additional constitutional argument against the closure 
of  proceedings.  For instance, in ABC, Inc. v. Powell, the Court of  Appeals for the Armed Forces 
found that an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to a public Article 32 investigation.41  Moreover, 
the court held that when the defendant has the right to a public proceeding, the press has a First 
Amendment right to attend.42  This distinction is important, as the amendments vindicate different 
interests.
As the above cases demonstrate, the case law generally deals with issues of  judicial practice, that 
is, where a presiding judge orders the closing of  a hearing or trial.  In the context of  the military 
FRPPLVVLRQVWZRDGGLWLRQDOZULQNOHVSUHVHQWWKHPVHOYHV7KHÀUVWLVWKDWRI DFFHVVWR*XDQWD-
namo Bay itself—an open hearing is useless if  the government restricts the press’ ability to observe 
SURFHHGLQJV7KHVHFRQGLVVXHFRQFHUQVWKHUROHRI SXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFHUVDQGRWKHUQRQMXULVWVLQ
determining issues of  access.
B. The Problem of  Access
As has been suggested in the context of  courts-martial, simply moving a trial to a remote loca-
WLRQPD\VRPHWLPHVSURWHFWFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQE\OLPLWLQJWKHHDVHZLWKZKLFKWKHSUHVVDQG
public may attend.43  The mere fact that the military commissions are held on a naval base at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba—an isolated slice of  land surrounded by ocean to the south and a hostile regime 
OHJDOO\LQDFFHVVLEOHWR$PHULFDQVMXVWRYHUWKHKLOOVWRWKHQRUWK³LPSRVHVVLJQLÀFDQWOLPLWVRQWKH
ability of  members of  the press to be physically present for the hearings held there.  
At least one federal court has considered the right of  the press to access Guantanamo Bay itself.  
37  See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Travers, 25 M.J. 61, 62 (C.M.A. 
1987); United States v. Scott, 48 M.J. 663, 666 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1998); M.R.E. 505.
38 United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 123 (C.M.A. 1977).
39  See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 806(b) (2008).
40  An Article 32 investigation is comparable to a civilian court preliminary hearing.  ABC, Inc., 47 M.J. at 365 (“[W]
hen an accused is entitled to a public hearing, the press enjoys the same right and has standing to complain if  access is 
denied”) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of  the County of  Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)). 
41  Id. (“[A]bsent ‘cause shown that outweighs the value of  openness,’ the military accused is likewise entitled to a 
public Article 32 investigative hearing.”) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of  California, Riverside County, 
464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)).
42  Id.
43  See Maj. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Analyzing the Constitutional Tensions and Applicability of  Military Rule of  Evidence 505 
in Courts-Martial over United States Service Members: Secrecy in the Shadow of  Longtree, 55 A.F. L. REV. 233, 266 (2004) (“In 
essence, there is no lawful prohibition against moving a court-martial to Diego Garcia, Guantanamo, or Adak.”).
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In Getty Images, media organizations sought an injunction that would have required the DOD to 
WUHDWVXFKJURXSVHTXDOO\ZKHQDVVLJQLQJWKHOLPLWHGVORWVDOORWWHGIRUWKHÁLJKWVWR*XDQWDQDPRDQG
seats in the courtroom to cover the military commissions.44  The district court did not consider the 
public’s right to access criminal proceedings under the First Amendment.45  Instead, it noted that 
“access [to Guantanamo Bay] is necessarily limited by the logistical support and resources that the 
PLOLWDU\FDQSURYLGHµDQGYRLFHGD´UHOXFWDQ>FH@WRLQWHUIHUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\LQWKHPLOLWDU\·VFRQGXFW
of  its affairs.”46  Consequently, the court chose not to “elaborate on the precise parameters of  equal 
access standards and procedures that may be required by the Constitution.”47  The court declined to 
issue an injunction, but did note that “the First and Fifth Amendments seem to require, at a mini-
mum, that before determining which media organizations receive the limited access available, the 
DOD must not only have some criteria to guide its determinations, but must have a reasonable way 
of  assessing whether the criteria are met.”48
Getty Images suggests that DOD rules limiting access to military bases that host military commis-
sions impact some constitutional rights, in that they implicitly restrict press access to those proceed-
ings.  While the judicial branch has historically shown deference to military matters,49 courts would 
OLNHO\ÀQGXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDODUXOHDEVROXWHO\SURKLELWLQJSUHVVDFFHVVWR*XDQWDQDPR%\LPSOLFD-
tion, and as noted by the D.C. District Court, the DOD is required to put in place rules that allow 
some level of  reasonable access by fairly-selected journalists.50
II. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Much has been written about the origins, strengths, and weaknesses of  the tribunals currently 
sitting at Guantanamo Bay, both in terms of  their transparency and their ability to deal with national 
security issues.51  This article will revisit the founding documents of  those courts only to the extent 
necessary to draw parallels between their foundations, rules, and procedures, those of  civilian courts 
44  Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of  Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2002). 
45  See id. at 122 (“No persuasive judicial precedent . . . has been cited, and in light of  the unique military context 
present here, the Court does not believe that the Constitution requires the establishment of  a press pool at Guantanamo 
Bay.”).  
46  Id. at 120–21.
47  Id. at 122.
48  Id. at 121.
49  See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (noting that courts “give great deference to the 
professional judgment of  military authorities concerning the relative importance of  a particular military interest); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 832 (2008) (stating, as regards foreign and military affairs, “perhaps in no other area 
has the Court accorded Congress greater deference” (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981)).
50 See 193 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (“[T]he First and Fifth Amendments seem to require, at a minimum, that . . . [the] DOD 
must not only have some criteria to guide its determinations, but must have a reasonable way of  assessing whether the 
criteria are met.”).
51  See e.g. William Glaberson, U.S. May Revive Guantanamo Military Courts, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/politics/02gitmo.html?_r=2; LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND LESSONS (2004); ABA Task Force on Terrorism and the Law, Report and Recommendations 
on Military Commissions (2002). 
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(notably the federal district courts), and the system of  courts-martial regulated by the UCMJ.
A. General Background
The Military Commissions Act of  2009 (MCA) currently governs the trials of  detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.52  The Act explicitly authorizes military judges to close commission proceedings 
WRWKHSXEOLFEXW´RQO\XSRQPDNLQJDVSHFLÀFÀQGLQJWKDWVXFKFORVXUHLVQHFHVVDU\WRSURWHFW
information the disclosure of  which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national 
security . . . [or to] ensure the physical safety of  individuals.”53  In the strict scrutiny language ex-
plained above, § 949d(c)(2) of  the MCA sets out the “state interests” deemed compelling enough by 
Congress to require derogation from the default open proceeding requirement.
The Act, however, suggests that the UCMJ serves as the model for interpreting commission 
rules by explicitly noting that “the judicial construction and application of  [the UCMJ]” are instruc-
tive in analyzing the Act, although it cautions that such judicial analysis is “not of  its own force 
binding on military commissions.”54  Further, recognizing the special nature of  the commissions, 
the Act provides that the Secretary of  Defense has some authority to “make such exceptions in the 
applicability of  the procedures and rules of  evidence otherwise applicable in general courts-martial 
as may be required by the unique circumstances of  the conduct of  military and intelligence opera-
tions during hostilities or by other practical need consistent with [the Military Commissions Act].”55
The Secretary’s designee, then-Deputy Secretary of  Defense Gordon England, issued the Regulation 
for Trial by Military Commission on April 27, 2007, pursuant to that authority.56  As to trial closure, 
KRZHYHUWKH5HJXODWLRQFRQWULEXWHVQRIXUWKHUJXLGDQFHH[FHSWIRUDUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKHÀQGLQJV
required to support the trial judge’s decision be “appended to the record of  trial.”57  This provides 
OLWWOHGLUHFWLRQDVLGHIURPDUHLWHUDWLRQWKDWDFWXDOÀQGLQJVRI IDFWPXVWEHPDGHE\DMXGJHVHHNLQJ
to close proceedings.
7KHÀQDODXWKRULWDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH$FWLVWKH0DQXDOIRU0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV00&
issued by the DOD in April 2010.58  Rule for Military Commission 806, contained in the MMC, is 
helpfully entitled “Public trial.”59  In discussing the laws governing closure, the Manual notes that 
“the military judge may take other lesser measures . . . to protect information and ensure the physical 
52  10 U.S.C. 47a (2010).  See also0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV$FWRI 3XE/6WDWFRGLÀHGDV
amended at 10 U.S.C. 47a (2010)).
53  10 U.S.C. 47a (2010) at § 949d(c)(2).
54 § 948b(c).
55  § 949(a)(b)(1).
56 OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMM’NS, DEP’T OF DEF., REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMM’NS (2007), http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/reg_for_trial_by_commission.pdf. [hereinafter RTMC].
57 Id. at 110 (§ 18-3:  Procedures Concerning Spectators).
58 DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/2010_Manual_for_
Military_Commissions.pdf  [hereinafter MMC].
59 Id. at II-73 (“Except as otherwise provided in chapter 47A of  title 10, United States Code, and this Manual, military 
commissions shall be publicly held.  For purposes of  this rule, ‘public’ includes representatives of  the press . . . .”).
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safety of  individuals.”607KH00&VSHFLÀFDOO\VXJJHVWVWKHXVHRI GHOD\HGEURDGFDVWWHFKQRORJLHV61
Moreover, it makes clear that the standard of  review a military judge uses when considering classi-
ÀHGPDWHULDOSXUVXDQWWRDGHFLVLRQWRFORVHWKHSURFHHGLQJLVQRWde novo.62 Rather, the judge is to 
defer to the classifying authority after verifying that governing regulations were followed.63
The Discussion section of  Rule 806 also notes that “there may be other sources of  authority to 
close the hearing, such as Mil. Comm. R. Evid. 412, or the authority of  a military judge to close a 
hearing in ‘unusual circumstances’ warranting an ex parte session.”64  But, neither of  those sources 
of  authority would appear to provide useful guidance to a military judge seeking to protect sensitive, 
DOEHLWXQFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQIURPJHQHUDOGLVVHPLQDWLRQ0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQ5XOHRI (YLGHQFH
412 governs admission of  evidence concerning nonconsensual sexual offenses.65  It requires a closed 
hearing when the military judge considers certain evidence generally covered by that Rule’s prohibi-
tion on evidence concerning an alleged victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition.  United States v. 
Kaspers addressed the right of  an accused to an ex parte hearing, at which the accused intended to ar-
gue the need for an expert witness at government expense.66  The court held that such hearings were 
generally offered only in “unusual circumstances,” which were not present in that case.67
Military commissions are subject to the jurisdiction of  their own appellate panel, decisions of  
which may be appealed to the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the District of  Columbia and, ultimately, 
to the Supreme Court.68  But, at present, there is little binding precedent constraining the manner in 
which military judges preside over these trials.  Most obviously, the United States Court of  Military 
Commission Review has yet to issue a ruling regarding press access and the limits of  judicial discre-
tion.  Also, as detailed above, the regulations promulgated by the DOD provide relatively minimal 
guidance.  Given the dearth of  other rules governing the commission judges’ proper role in granting 
or limiting media access to the trials, the Military Commissions Act’s suggestion that the case law of  
courts-martial should guide interpretation of  the Act is particularly apt.  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PROVIDING ACCESS WHILE SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
A. Appellate Review and the Writ of  Mandamus
As mentioned above, the military justice system has allowed media organizations to directly sue 
for access to courts-martial.  In at least one seminal case, ABC Inc., the Court of  Appeals for the 
60  Id. at II-74 (discussion to R. 806(b)(2)(C)); see also 10 U.S.C. § 949d(c). 
61  MMC¸ supra note 58, at II-74.
62  Id.
63  Id. ´7KHUHYLHZLVWRYHULI\WKHH[LVWHQFHRI DOHJDOEDVLVIRUWKHDJHQF\RIÀFLDO·VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQLV
FODVVLÀHGDQGWKDWQRVXPPDU\RI VXFKLQIRUPDWLRQFDQEHSURYLGHGFRQVLVWHQWZLWKQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\µ
64  Id. (citing United States v. Kaspers, 47 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
65  Id. at III-16 (“Mil. Comm. R. Evid. 412:  Nonconsensual sexual offenses; relevance of  victim’s behavior or sexual 
predisposition”).
66  See Kaspers, 47 M.J. at 177.
67  Id. at 180 (citing United States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288, 291 (C.M.A. 1986)).
68  See 10 U.S.C. § 950(a)–(g) (2006).
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Armed Forces (CAAF) ordered a pre-trial hearing opened to the press after several media companies 
ÀOHGIRUDZULWRI PDQGDPXVGLUHFWO\WR&$$)69  The court did not rely on any provision of  the 
8&0-LQÀQGLQJMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKHPDWWHUDQGUHMHFWHGDQDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHPHGLDRUJDQL]DWLRQV
VKRXOGKDYHÀUVWUDLVHGWKHLVVXHEHIRUHWKH$UP\&RXUWRI &ULPLQDO$SSHDOV70  Rather, the court 
relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by 
Act of  Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of  their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usages and principles of  law.”71
Notably, this provision does not specify which courts “established by Act of  Congress” may is-
sue a writ of  mandamus.  If  the CAAF or a service Court of  Criminal Appeals, all of  which are Ar-
ticle I courts established by the UCMJ (as opposed to Article III courts established by the Judiciary 
Act), may invoke § 1651, it appears that the Court for Military Commission Review (CMCR) may do 
so as well.  Consequently, one approach to creating a body of  relevant case law would be for press 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVWRÀOHSHWLWLRQVIRUZULWVRI PDQGDPXVLQDSSURSULDWHFDVHVHLWKHUWRWKH&0&5RU
the D.C. Circuit, challenging a military judge’s closure orders.  While this approach has the advantage 
of  having been successful in the UCMJ context, and presents the possibility of  potentially creating 
DERG\RI JXLGLQJODZIRUPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQMXGJHVWKHUHPD\EHSUDFWLFDOEDUULHUVWRÀOLQJDQG
appearing before a part-time tribunal like the CMCR.
B. The Military Judge: Discretion and Enforcement
As previously noted, the military judge has authority to close hearings either to safeguard pro-
tected information or to prevent physical harm to an individual.  Yet, military judges have surpris-
LQJO\OLWWOHJXLGDQFHLQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKLVUHVSRQVLELOLW\&RQVHTXHQWO\DWSUHVHQWWKHÀUVWUXOLQJVRQ
closing proceedings to the press will be made, almost in a vacuum, by military trial judges.
The military judges sitting at Guantanamo Bay are, by law, active-duty military judges in the vari-
ous military services.72  That is, they have served as trial judges in courts-martial, and do so simulta-
neously with their commission duties.  They are informed by their experience as military lawyers and 
their deep knowledge of, and familiarity with, the court-martial system.  For instance, one of  the au-
thors was present for a military commission hearing in the Noor Uthman Muhammed case.  At that 
hearing, the commission judge, Navy Captain Moira Modzelewski, explicitly noted her own practice 
as a court-martial judge in helping the defense counsel gain access to prosecution FBI witnesses.  
Whereas pre-hearing interviews of  prosecution witnesses by the defense is strictly voluntary in the 
civilian federal courts, such meetings are a routine (albeit not required) practice of  courts-martial.  
Of  course, there are a number of  differences between the court-martial and the military com-
69  47 M.J. 363, 366 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
70  Id. at 364.
71  See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
 86&ME $´PLOLWDU\MXGJHVKDOOEHDFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHURI WKHDUPHGIRUFHVZKRLVDPHPEHU
RI WKHEDURI D)HGHUDOFRXUWRUDPHPEHURI WKHEDURI WKHKLJKHVWFRXUWRI D6WDWHDQGZKRLVFHUWLÀHGWREHTXDOLÀHG
for duty under section 826 of  this title (article 26 of  the Uniform Code of  Military Justice) as a military judge of  general 
courts-martial by the Judge Advocate General of  the armed force of  which such military judge is a member.”).
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mission systems.  Most obviously, the case law concerning public access to courts-martial is likely 
inapplicable to military commissions, at least in practice.  While one may generally be admitted to a 
military base to observe a court-martial, access to Guantanamo Bay is by invitation only.73  Similarly, 
WKHDQWLFLSDWHGLQFUHDVHGQHHGIRUFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQLQWKHFRPPLVVLRQWULDOVDVRSSRVHGWRWKH
UDUHLQWURGXFWLRQRI FODVVLÀHGHYLGHQFHLQDFRXUWPDUWLDOKHLJKWHQVWKHULVNRI LQDGYHUWHQWGLVFOR-
VXUH7KLVFUHDWHVDPDMRUGLIÀFXOW\IRUPLOLWDU\MXGJHV7KH\DUHUHTXLUHGE\UHJXODWLRQVDQGDUJX-
ably by the Constitution, to provide the greatest possible access to commission proceedings.  But, by 
making the proceedings more transparent, they increase the risk that a party, counsel, or witness will 
UHIHUHQFHFODVVLÀHGRURSHUDWLRQDOO\VHQVLWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQLQRSHQFRXUW
&RXUWRUGHUVSURKLELWLQJWKHUHSXEOLFDWLRQRI VXFKFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQSUHVHQWRQHSRVVLEOH
solution to this dilemma—a reasonable remedy since the people present in the military commis-
sion courtrooms are both limited in number and screened for access.  But, such an order must be 
enforceable to be effective, and it is unclear whether a military judge’s contempt powers under the 
0&$DUHXSWRWKDWWDVN6SHFLÀFDOO\LWLVXQFOHDULI DPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQMXGJHKDVMXULVGLFWLRQ
to hold a reporter in contempt for violating any protective order.  In this context, the commissions’ 
jurisdiction is limited: “A military commission may punish for contempt any person who uses any 
menacing word, sign or gesture in its presence, or who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or disor-
GHU7KHSXQLVKPHQWPDQ\QRWH[FHHGFRQÀQHPHQWIRUGD\VRUDÀQHRI RUERWKµ74 The 
2010 Manual for Military Commissions explicitly includes civilians in this provision, with the Con-
vening Authority being informed and tasked with “taking necessary action.”75  But the jurisdiction 
of  the Convening Authority over a civilian, especially one whose only contact with the proceedings 
is as an observer, is nebulous, as the commissions’ jurisdiction is limited to alien unprivileged enemy 
belligerents.76  Nothing in the 2009 MCA suggests expanded jurisdiction for the Convening Author-
ity himself.
Judges in courts-martial have stronger contempt powers.  Beyond the powers noted above, they 
may also sanction any witness who refuses to appear in court.77  The contempt order may be certi-
ÀHGWRDFLYLOLDQ86$WWRUQH\·VRIÀFHDQGHQIRUFHGE\IHGHUDOPDUVKDOVLQIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUW78
7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJH³ZKRJHQHUDOO\HQMR\VXQTXHVWLRQHGMXULVGLFWLRQ³FRXOGWKHQÀQHRU
imprison the subject of  a contempt order.  But, current law explicitly denies military commission 
judges this authority.79  The National Defense Authorization Act for 2011 includes an amendment to 
WKHFRQWHPSWSRZHUVRI DPLOLWDU\MXGJHWKDWVLJQLÀFDQWO\LQFUHDVHVDPLOLWDU\MXGJH·VDXWKRULW\LQWKLV
73  See, e.g., DOD Media Policy, supra note 2. 
74  MMC, supra note 58, at II-14 (Rule 201(c)).
75  See idDW,,5XOHHDQG'LVFXVVLRQGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQSURSHUSXQLVKPHQWDQGQRWLÀFDWLRQIRUD
civilian versus military person after they are charged with contempt). 
76  10 U.S.C. § 948(c) (2006).
77  10 U.S.C. § 847(a), 848 (2011) .
78  § 847(b)–(c).
79  MMC, supra note 58, at II-77 (Commentary to Rule 809).
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area.80  Under the newly expanded language, a military judge’s contempt power currently extends to 
any person who “willfully disobeys the [court’s] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command 
. . . .”816XFKSRZHULVHVSHFLDOO\QHHGHGLQWKHPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQFRQWH[WWRLQVWLOOFRQÀGHQFH
in military judges that any required protective orders will be obeyed or enforced.  But, again, the 
legislation explicitly exempts the current incarnation of  military commissions.82  In short, the scope 
and enforceability of  a court-martial judge’s contempt powers are far more robust than in a military 
commission context.
Thus, military judges have distinctly different scopes of  contempt authority, depending on 
whether they are presiding over courts-martial or over military commissions.  In the latter case, a 
prudent judge cannot be certain he or she can adequately enforce an order protecting inadvertently 
UHOHDVHGFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQ&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHLVDQREYLRXVWHPSWDWLRQWRHUURQWKHVLGHRI 
FDXWLRQFORVLQJSURFHHGLQJVZKHQWKHUHLVHYHQDUHPRWHFKDQFHWKDWFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQZLOOEH
discussed, and generally limiting the portions of  commission proceedings open to the press.  This 
is not a certainty, but the calculus is plain, as is the risk of  overly-secretive proceedings.  Congress 
could easily eliminate this risk by trusting military judges with the same powers they enjoy when they 
preside over courts-martial.
&7KH5ROHRI WKH3HQWDJRQ3XEOLF$IIDLUV2IÀFH
While lawyers traditionally look to the courts for guidance, the institution with the most direct 
LQÁXHQFHRQWKLVSDUWLFXODULVVXHLVQRWMXGLFLDO,QWKHFDVHRI SUHVVDFFHVVWRWKHFRPPLVVLRQVDW
*XDQWDQDPR%D\WKDWLQVWLWXWLRQLVWKH'2'2IÀFHRI 3XEOLF$IIDLUVRIWHQZRUNLQJWKURXJKLWV
VXERUGLQDWHDUPWKH2IÀFHRI 0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV3XEOLF$IIDLUV20&3$
As already noted, the four reporters expelled from Guantanamo Bay in May 2010 were not 
barred for violating a court order or anything else directly related to the judicial conduct of  the 
military commissions.83  Indeed, the military judge presiding over that commission hearing did not 
implement the ban.  Rather, the reporters ran afoul of  the “Media Policy and Ground Rules” they 
had signed as a prerequisite to securing permission to travel to Cuba.84  That document is drafted 
and promulgated by public affairs professionals attached to the military commissions, not by the 
commission judges themselves.
,QGHHGSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFHUV·LQÁXHQFHRYHUMRXUQDOLVWV·DFFHVVWR*XDQWDQDPR%D\DVZHOODV
the scope of  their reporting, is best illustrated by the results of  the May 2010 expulsions.  The jour-
nalists had been expelled for naming a witness whose identity was already in the public record, infor-
80  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383 542(b), 124 STAT. 4218 (2011), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000848----000-.html.
81  Id.
82  Id.
83  Peters, supra note 1, at 1.
84  Id.. 
12 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 1
mation that the journalists gained from sources outside the military commissions.85  Under new rules 
promulgated in September 2010, publishing that exact kind of  information is no longer a violation 
of  the Ground Rules.86  This change in policy, along with others contained in the revised document, 
was not the direct result of  litigation; in fact, no judge ruled on the expulsions.  Rather, the Penta-
JRQUHYLVHGWKHJURXQGUXOHVDWWKHVROHGLVFUHWLRQRI WKHSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVLQWKH2IÀFHRI WKH
6HFUHWDU\RI 'HIHQVHDIWHUPHGLDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGWKHLUDWWRUQH\VPHWZLWK'2'RIÀFLDOV
That development suggests that questions of  press access should be centralized and rigorously 
considered by senior-level DOD personnel.  To that end, one of  the most helpful aspects of  the 
new rules is that they now contain appeals provisions, something not available under the previous 
system.  Disagreements concerning whether photographs and video compromise Guantanamo Bay 
security may be appealed to the Commander of  the Group Task Force with responsibility for the 
commission sites, who must then decide the issue within 24 hours.87  Moreover, reporters are explic-
itly permitted to challenge the designation of  particular information as protected.  They may do so 
E\DSSHDOLQJWRWKHPLOLWDU\MXGJHWRZKRPWKHSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVZLOOGHIHU0HPEHUVRI WKH
press also can opt to appeal to the Joint Task Force Commander, depending on which of  those two 
authorities made the initial designation.880RUHRYHULI SXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVEHOLHYHDYLRODWLRQRI 
the ground rules has occurred, media members may appeal to the Principal Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Public Affairs.89
,QVKRUWWKHSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVDQGRWKHUPLOLWDU\PHPEHUVZKRDUHDVVLJQHGRQDQHYHU
changing basis to escort the media exert enormous practical control over press access to Guanta-
namo Bay and commission proceedings.907KHWUDQVLWLRQWRDPRUHÁH[LEOHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH
3HQWDJRQSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFHDQGWKHSUHVVLVZHOFRPHDQGWKHDSSHDOVSURFHGXUHVLQSODFHXQGHU
WKHUHYLVHG*URXQG5XOHVVKRXOGKHOSHVWDEOLVKDERG\RI JXLGHOLQHVWRDVVLVWORZHUOHYHORIÀFLDOV
and, ultimately, facilitate the maximum public access consistent with protecting national security.  
But the Ground Rules cannot replace the powers of  a military judge to control his or her courtroom 
and the protective orders issued therein, a point that is explicitly conceded by the Ground Rules 
themselves.91
85  Kevin Baron, Pentagon Drops Controversial Ban on GTMO Reporters, STARS AND STRIPES (July 13, 2010),  http://www.
stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-1.8040/pentagon-drops-controversial-ban-on-gtmo-reporters-1.110927
86  See DOD Media Policy, supra note 2, at 4 (“[A reporter] will not be considered in violation of  these ground rules 
for re-publishing what otherwise would be considered Protected Information, where that information was legitimately 
obtained in the course of  newsgathering independent of  any receipt of  information while at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay], 
or while transiting to or from GTMO on transportation provided by DOD (or other U.S. government entities.”).
87  Id. at 6 (Rule E(6)).
88  Id. at 10–11 (Rule J(1)–(2)).
89  Id. at 11 (Rule J(3)).
90  Carol Rosenberg, Commentary: For Reporters, the Rules at Guantanamo Change Daily, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (July 26, 
2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/26/98146/commentary-for-reporters-the-rules.html.
91  See DOD Media Policy, supra note 2 at 11 (Rule J(4)) (“Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a 
military judge’s authority within his or her courtroom.”).
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D. The Role of  Congress
 $WWKHHQGRI WKHGD\ZULWVRI PDQGDPXVDQGDSSHDOVWRSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVDUHVWRSJDS
measures that do not solve the larger First Amendment issues. One concrete suggestion for solving 
the dilemma would have Congress enshrine greater press access in the statutory law governing the 
commissions themselves, without negatively affecting national security interests.  Such a revision has 
already been suggested above:  Provide substantial, enforceable contempt powers for military judges 
assigned to the commissions.  But other solutions should also be considered.
Obvious alternatives include the following:  requiring a greater number of  courtroom slots for 
reporters; establishing explicit statutory standing for individual reporters to challenge the closing 
of  proceedings before the military judge as the individual most familiar with his or her own closure 
decision; and, providing explicit statutory authority for the CMCR to review closure orders on an 
interlocutory basis.  A model for such appeals could be the practice of  the United States Supreme
Court in capital cases, where an individual member of  the Court may hear appeals (such as requests 
for stays of  execution) and can issue rulings on the subject.92
Working out the parameters of  the media’s right to cover these historic commissions is a press-
ing concern, particularly given the small fraction of  the American public—and even the small 
proportion of  victims and family members—who will ever get the opportunity to attend the com-
missions in person.  The urgency is all the more acute now, given that the military commissions are 
PRYLQJIXOOVSHHGDKHDGLQWU\LQJWKHPRVWKLJKSURÀOHDQGFRPSOH[WHUURUFDVHVVLQFHWKHDWWDFNVD
decade ago.93
IV. CONCLUSION
,QUHFHQWPRQWKVWKH2IÀFHRI 0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQVKDVH[KLELWHGDUHQHZHGFRPPLWPHQW
to transparency in the commission proceedings by revamping its website94 and providing remote 
viewing locations for victims, family members, and the press—but not the general public—to watch 
commission hearings.95  Certainly, such increased access is a welcome development, but it likely 
PHDQVWKDWWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKHULJKWVLQFRQÁLFWGHVFULEHGLQWKLVDUWLFOHZLOOQRWÀQGMXGLFLDORU
legislative resolution any time soon.
92  United States Supreme Court Rules 22 and 23.
93 See 9/11 Suspects Charged Again at Gitmo, NBC News (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/politicshalid-Sheikh-Mohammed-911-Suspects-Guantanamo-122878234.html; Dwyer Arce, WikiLeaks Releases 
&ODVVLÀHG*XDQWDQDPR'RFXPHQWV, JURIST (April 25, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/wikileaks-releases-
FODVVLÀHGJXDQWDQDPRGRFXPHQWVSKS&DURO5RVHQEHUJPentagon Seeks Death for Accused USS Cole Bomber, MIAMI HERALD
(April 20, 2011),  http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/20/2177510/pentagon-seeks-death-for-accused.html
94 Charles “Cully” Stimson, Military Commissions Just Became More Transparent, available at http://blog.heritage.
org/2011/09/28/military-commissions-just-became-more-transparent/ (last visited November 6, 2011).
95 Carol Rosenberg, Prosecutors propose wider public viewing of  Guantánamo terror trial, MIAMI HERALD
(November 5, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/05/v-print/2488542/prosecutors-propose-wider-public.
html#ixzz1cyEPnpQs
